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Tax Competition and the Dormant Commerce 
Clause: A Japanese Perspective 
Keigo Fuchi* 
INTRODUCTION
Given the vital role the dormant Commerce Clause plays in 
delineating tax jurisdictions of the states and local governments, it 
would be difficult to imagine what would happen without this 
legal doctrine. This Article will show that the absence of a 
dormant Commerce Clause equivalent in Japan has given rise to 
serious tax competition. By illustrating the significance of this 
legal doctrine and the holding in South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc.,1
this Article demonstrates that Japan could use a similar legal 
framework of fiscal federalism from a comparative perspective. 
Part I traces the historical development of the dormant 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence with respect to the collection 
duty for consumption taxes. Particularly, it articulates the rise 
and fall of four theories on the constitutionality of the collection 
duty proposed by the Supreme Court Justices in the 1940s. Part I 
concludes by pointing out that Wayfair removes obstacles to 
achieving ideal state consumption taxes. 
Part II starts by briefly describing the Japanese tax system.2
Japan is not a federal state, and certain statutes regulating local 
governments (both prefectures and municipalities) secure each 
governments’ autonomy. These statutes grant local governments a 
qualified power to impose their own “extra-statutory taxes”—taxes 
that are exclusively based on ordinances [jorei] of a local government. 
The tax revenue system for local governments in Japan is unique. 
Property tax and local personal income tax are kept by municipalities 
as their principal sources of revenue. Local corporate income tax is 
the most important source of revenue for prefectures. Such division 
and allocation of the sources of revenue gives rise to a considerable 
disparity of tax revenue among local governments. This Part 
illustrates how this disparity gives rise to tax competition among 
local governments in Japan, highlighting the absence of a Japanese 
 * Professor of Law, Kobe University Graduate School of Law. 
1 South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2089–96 (2018). 
2 See infra Part II. 
90 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 22:1
dormant Commerce Clause equivalent. The Japanese courts have 
failed to put forward a meaningful standard to judge whether local 
tax legislation interferes with, and places an undue burden on, free 
movement of goods and services within the country. The content of 
the provisions of the Local Tax Act—the statute governing whether 
local tax legislation interferes with, and thereby places an undue 
burden on, the movement of goods and services within Japan—is, to 
say the least, vague. Moreover, it is not obvious whether clear 
principles for allocating taxing powers among local governments are 
truly recognized in Japan. Part II then discusses two examples that 
highlight the absence of a dormant Commerce Clause equivalent in 
Japan. First, this Part examines taxation by some local governments 
that induces the exports of nuclear waste. It is apparent that the tax 
discriminates against interstate commerce, but there are no means to 
invalidate the tax. The second is the recent “hometown tax donation” 
system that makes it possible for a taxpayer to pay a part of his tax 
to other local governments. Although this system is becoming 
popular and being praised as an excellent tool for revitalizing local 
economy in Japan, it conflicts with most of the principles pronounced 
by the United States Supreme Court. This Article concludes by 
emphasizing the significance of the dormant Commerce Clause and 
Wayfair and how Japan can learn from United States jurisprudence 
and its local taxation system. 
I. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE DORMANT COMMERCE 
CLAUSE CASES ON THE COLLECTION DUTY FOR STATE 
CONSUMPTION TAXES
A. Introduction 
In this Part, this Article discusses the role of the dormant 
Commerce Clause in limiting the tax sovereignty of the states. 
Before proceeding to an analysis of the cases, two preliminary 
comments are worth noting. 
First, apart from concrete provisions of the constitution and 
statutes of each country, the extent of taxing power can be divided 
into two questions. The first question is whether imposing a given 
tax to a given person, property, or transaction is within the scope 
of the tax jurisdiction of the state or local government. When the 
taxation is deemed to be an extraterritorial exercise of its tax 
jurisdiction, it is per se unconstitutional or illegal. The second 
question asks, given that the tax itself is within the government’s 
jurisdiction, whether the imposition of the tax affects the economic 
activity and/or the decision-making of people so much that it 
conflicts with the exercise of the police power of other states or 
local governments. The exercise of the taxing power by one state 
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may significantly harm another state’s exercise of regulatory 
power. In this case, the exercise of taxing power will be 
invalidated. In the United States, throughout the development of 
case law on state taxation, these two questions are treated 
concurrently and sometimes inseparably. Both the Due Process 
Clause and the dormant Commerce Clause are employed for 
answering the questions. 
Second, the nature of the tax or the duty in question is 
important in determining their validity. Since its birth as a 
judicial doctrine, the dormant Commerce Clause has often 
applied to state and local tax cases. One of the most difficult 
issues has been determining the conditions under which a state 
can mandate nonresidents or out of state businesses to be subject 
to state use tax.3 Here, the consumers of goods and services, to 
whom the economic burden of the tax shifts, are supposed to be 
residents of the state. This is a difficult issue because the nature 
of use tax is equivocal. 
To begin with, the state may impose sales tax on businesses 
as an indirect tax. 4  The taxpayers of the sales tax are the 
businesses, whereas the economic burden of the tax shifts to the 
consumers of the goods and services sold. The businesses are 
located in the state or at least have sufficient factual connection 
with the jurisdiction. Therefore, nothing prevents the state from 
imposing sales tax liability on them. 
Use tax is, from its inception, a supplementary tax contrived to 
avoid any possible doubts as to the taxing power against out-of-state 
businesses. The taxpayers of the use tax are consumers—residents 
of the state. They also bear the burden of the tax. There is no 
problem for the state to impose the tax on its residents. However, 
the key issue is whether it is possible to designate businesses as the 
agent for collection and payment of the tax. In use tax, the 
consumers have only secondary liability, even though they are the 
original taxpayers. Otherwise they would be exempt from the duty. 
If we take this legal construction at face value, there appears to be 
no extraterritorial exercise of taxing power. The consumers, the 
original taxpayers, are within the boundary of the state. It is their 
agent who was on the outside of the territory by chance. Moreover, 
it might be argued that the liability of the agent is not tax liability, 
but a duty to act or cooperate with the state in a certain way. 
3 See generally Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. 2080. 
4 See generally John L. Mikesell, Remote Vendors and American Sales and Use 
Taxation: The Balance between Fixing the Problem and Fixing the Tax, 53 NAT’L TAX J. 
1273 (2000) (indicating that retail sales taxes are defensible as the American approach to 
indirect consumption taxation). 
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If this is the case, the constitutionality of the duty would be 
better decided according to non-tax precedent. 
However, if we take seriously the fact that use tax is in effect 
a version of sales tax, we should apply the same legal standards 
used to analyze sales tax. It follows that the businesses located 
out-of-state must be regarded not as just a collecting agent, but 
as the taxpayer of use tax. Thus, it would be almost impossible to 
justify use tax without also justifying sales tax against 
out-of-state retailers at the same time. 
B. Early Cases 
The earliest case on collection duty and the dormant 
Commerce Clause was an excise tax case.5 In Monamotor Oil Co. 
v. Johnson, Iowa imposed a license fee on all motor vehicle fuel 
used in the state. 6  The Iowa statute required distributors to 
charge users a price that includes the license fee and to remit 
license fee proceeds to the state treasurer.7 The Plaintiff claimed 
that the statute imposed a burden upon interstate commerce.8
The Supreme Court, in an opinion delivered by Justice Roberts, 
rejected that claim holding that the levy “falls on the local use 
after interstate commerce has ended” 9  and the distributor’s 
burden is “too slight.”10
A few years later, the first case on use tax reached the 
Supreme Court. 11  In Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher,
California required retailers that maintained a place of business 
in the state to collect use tax from purchasers.12 The Plaintiff, 
who manufactured and sold “comptometers” in the state through 
two general agents, claimed that the collection of use tax 
conflicted with the dormant Commerce Clause and the Due 
Process Clause.13 Justice McReynolds’s opinion for the Supreme 
Court summarily rejected the Plaintiff’s claim without presenting 
much, if any, reasoning for the Court’s decision.14
A Supreme Court decision in 1940, regarding sales tax by 
New York City (not use tax), articulated the Court’s attitude 
toward the collection duty of retailers. 15  In a footnote in 
5 See Monamotor Oil v. Johnson, 292 U.S. 86, 93 (1934). 
6 Id.
7 Id. at 88–89. 
8 See id. at 93.  
9 Id.
10 Id. at 94. 
11 See Felt & Tarrant Mfg. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 62, 64 (1939). 
12 Id. at 66. 
13 Id. at 64, 66. 
14 See id. at 65–66. 
15 See McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining, 309 U.S. 33 (1940). 
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McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., Justice Stone made 
clear the duty “does not violate the [C]ommerce [C]lause.”16 At that 
time, the question of whether out-of-state businesses’ duty to collect 
tax was constitutional was not treated separately from the 
constitutionality of the tax itself. Even though the Court held the 
duty to collect tax to be lawful in these three cases, it did not offer 
any material reason for its decisions. 
In 1944, two decisions of the Supreme Court were handed 
down on the same day directly dealing with the collection duty of 
use tax as well as the related question of territorial limits of 
taxing power for sales tax.17 In McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co., the 
issue was whether the levy of sales tax by Arkansas on a 
Tennessee corporation with no place of business in Arkansas 
was constitutional.18 The Court held, in the opinion by Justice 
Frankfurter, that taxing sales consummated out-of-state “would be 
to project its powers beyond its boundaries and to tax an interstate 
transaction.”19 The Court also emphasized the difference between a 
sales tax and a use tax. Whereas the former is “a tax on the freedom 
of purchase,” the latter is “a tax on the enjoyment of that which was 
purchased.” 20  In General Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm’n of 
Iowa, the issue was whether it was constitutional for Iowa to 
impose a duty to collect use tax from a Minnesota corporation.21
Based on the lower court’s finding that the corporation was a 
“retailer maintaining a place of business in [the] state,” the 
Supreme Court, in an opinion also delivered by Justice 
Frankfurter, upheld the Iowa legislation and affirmed the 
collection duty. 22  In sum, Justice Frankfurter’s opinions 
distinguished use tax from sales tax and applied a different 
standard in judging the constitutionality of each.23 It is worth 
noting that Justice Frankfurter’s opinions did not refer to the 
Due Process Clause in either of the cases.24
The opinions delivered by Justice Frankfurter garnered 
concurrences and dissents by other Justices. These concurrences 
and dissents opened the door to the development of the constitutional 
doctrines on the collection duty. 
16 Id. at 50 n.9. 
17 See generally McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327 (1944); Gen. Trading Co. 
v. State Tax Comm’n of Iowa, 322 U.S. 335 (1944). 
18 Dilworth, 322 U.S. at 328. 
19 Id. at 330. 
20 Id.
21 Gen. Trading Co., 322 U.S. at 336. 
22 Id. at 337–39. 
23 See Dilworth, 322 U.S. at 330; Gen. Trading Co., 322 U.S. at 338.  
24 See generally Dilworth, 322 U.S. 327; Gen. Trading Co., 322 U.S. 335. 
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In his dissenting opinion in Dilworth, Justice Douglas 
criticized the majority opinion for being inconsistent with the 
Court’s precedents.25 His claim stemmed from the observation that 
the economic impact of sales tax and use tax are the same.26
According to Justice Douglas, both sales and use taxes are indirect 
consumption taxes on the consumer. 27  In his dissent, Justice 
Douglas opined, “[i]n terms of state power, receipt of goods within 
the State of the buyer is as adequate a basis for the exercise of the 
taxing power as use within the State.”28 It follows that as long as 
imposing use tax does not conflict with the dormant Commerce 
Clause, levying sales tax does not either. 29  Although Justice 
Douglas said nothing about the collection duty in his dissent, from 
his view that sales tax and use tax are one and the same, we can 
infer that he wanted to see as little difference as possible in the 
collection process of the two taxes. 
Justice Jackson also found an affinity between the two taxes. 
However, unlike Justice Douglas, Justice Jackson asserted that 
not only the sales tax in Dilworth, but also the use tax in General 
Trading Co., should be invalidated.30 In his dissent in General 
Trading Co., Justice Jackson formulated the issue to be whether 
a person is within the jurisdiction of a state.31 He first assumed 
that the power to make a person a tax collector is the same as the 
power to tax.32 It follows that a nonresident who should not be a 
taxpayer for the purpose of sales tax must not be a tax collector 
of use tax either.33 Justice Jackson built his argument on the 
concept of jurisdiction but did not articulate the legal basis from 
which the concept was derived. 
Justice Rutledge, who would have upheld both the sales tax in 
Dilworth and the use tax in General Trading Co., distinguished 
the Due Process Clause from the dormant Commerce Clause.34
He considered the Due Process Clause as placing jurisdictional 
limitations on tax in general and thus, saw little significance in 
the name of sales tax or use tax. 35  Rather, Justice Rutledge 
25 See Dilworth, 322 U.S. at 332 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
26 Id. at 332–34 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (indicating that “realistically the sales tax is a 
tax on the receipt of that which was purchased” and is therefore equivalent to the use tax). 
27 Id. at 333 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
28 Id. at 334 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
29 See id. (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
30 See Gen. Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm’n of Iowa, 322 U.S. 335, 339–40 (1944) 
(Jackson, J., dissenting). 
31 Id. at 339 (Jackson, J., dissenting).  
32 See id. (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
33 See id. at 339–40 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
34 McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 349, 353–54 (1944) (Rutledge, J., dissenting 
in Dilworth and concurring in Gen. Trading Co.).
35 Id. at 350–51. 
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reasoned that both are “in fact and effect a tax levied on an 
interstate transaction.”36 From the Due Process Clause perspective, 
both the “state of origin and [state] of market” have taxing 
power.37 However, the dormant Commerce Clause requires more 
substantive consideration for the effect of the taxation. 38  The 
standard to be applied here is an analysis of the total burden of a 
given type of tax (i.e., the burden when all the states levy various 
types of taxes, and place cumulative, discriminatory, or special 
burdens on interstate commerce).39 Justice Rutledge’s dissent in 
Dilworth, however, has another assumption as its rationale: All 
the state sales/use tax should be construed as a destination-based 
consumption tax.40 Justice Rutledge defended the Arkansas tax in 
Dilworth as such a tax.41 Justice Rutledge, like Justice Douglas, 
did not give the collection duty special consideration independent 
from substantive tax liability. 
C. Miller Bros., Scripto, and Bellas Hess
In Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, Justice Jackson’s opinion for 
the Court clarified several issues in construing the collection 
duty of an out-of-state retailer.42 First, the question to be asked is 
whether imposing a duty to collect is within the reach of a state’s 
taxing power.43 Second, the analysis of this legal concept has 
developed, not only from precedent regarding the Due Process 
Clause,44 but also from the dormant Commerce Clause.45 Third, 
there must be a link to justify the exercise of a state’s taxing 
power such as “domicile or residence,” “the situs of property,” 
“the keeping of tangible or intangible personalty,” “[c]ertain 
activities or transactions carried on within a state, such as the 
use and sale of property,” or “incorporation by a state or 
permission to do business there . . . .”46
In Miller Bros., Maryland imposed a duty to collect use tax on a 
Delaware vendor on all goods it sold to Maryland residents and 
seized the vendor’s truck for failing to collect the tax.47 The Court 
found that the original tax liability of Maryland residents did not 
provide grounds to impose a collection duty on an out-of-state 
36 Id. at 357. 
37 Id. at 358. 
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 361. 
41 See id.
42 Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344–46 (1954). 
43 Id. at 342. 
44 Id. at 344–45. 
45 Id. at 344. 
46 Id. at 345 (footnotes omitted). 
47 Id. at 341. 
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vendor.48 The Court also distinguished the Miller Bros. case from 
General Trading Co.49 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Douglas 
asserted that the majority’s opinion would distort economic 
activity given that the state imposed only a minimal burden on 
the collector while there was sufficient contact between the 
vendor and the state.50
In Scripto Inc. v. Carson, Justice Clark’s opinion for the 
Court identified the nexus between the state and the object of 
taxation by following the definite link or minimum connection 
standard of Miller Bros.51 However, Justice Clark declared that 
the case was controlled by the holding in General Trading Co.52
It was National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Illinois that formulated 
the physical presence rule, a standard mainly dependent on a 
vendor or seller’s physical presence in a state.53 The opinion of 
the Court, written by Justice Stewart, inferred from the 
preceding cases “[a] sharp distinction . . . between mail order 
sellers with retail outlets, solicitors, or property within a State, 
and those who do no more than communicate with customers in 
the State by mail or common carrier as part of a general 
interstate business.”54 In Bellas Hess, “[a]ll of the contacts which 
[Bellas Hess] . . . [had] with the State [were] via the United 
States mail or common carrier.” 55  The Court sided with the 
putative obligor’s constitutional objections to the collection and 
revoked the payment duty of use tax required by the Illinois 
statutes. Justice Fortas’s dissenting opinion applied a less 
formalistic standard from the same cases and found in the facts 
of Bellas Hess “a sufficient nexus” to impose collection duty.56
D. Complete Auto and Quill
Until the advent of Quill Corp. v. North Dakota,57 the cases 
on the collection duty of use tax were principally independent 
from those on state tax liability in general, although Justice 
Jackson suggested in General Trading Co. and Miller Bros. that 
48 Id. at 347. 
49 Id. at 346–47. 
50 Id. at 357–58 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
51 Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207, 210–11 (1960). 
52 Id. at 210. 
53 Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753, 758 (1967). 
54 Id.
55 Id. at 754. 
56 Id. at 761–62 (Fortas, J., dissenting) (internal quotations omitted). 
57 Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992). 
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the collection duty and tax liability are identical for the purpose 
of the Due Process Clause and the dormant Commerce Clause.58
In Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, a Michigan motor 
carrier insisted that the Mississippi sales tax conflicted with the 
dormant Commerce Clause.59 The tax was equal to five percent of 
the gross income of a transportation business in Mississippi.60
The motor carrier claimed that the tax imposed a burden on the 
privilege of engaging in business in the state, and that its activity 
being interstate commerce, violated the holding in Spector.61 The 
Court, however, simply overruled Spector in favor of the following 
four-pronged test:62
These decisions have considered not the formal language of the tax 
statute but rather its practical effect, and have sustained a tax 
against Commerce Clause challenge when the tax is applied to an 
activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, is fairly 
apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and 
is fairly related to the service provided by the State.63
This test undoubtedly rationalized the approach to constitutionalize a 
state tax under the dormant Commerce Clause. In fact, according to 
experts of constitutional law, the Court has since then “consistently 
followed” this test.64 One of the remaining questions is how Bellas 
Hess would be analyzed under this test given that Bellas Hess did 
not precisely distinguish the Due Process Clause and the dormant 
Commerce Clause. Moreover, Bellas Hess was concerned not with tax 
liability itself, but with the collection duty.65
In Quill, the Court revisited the same question as Bellas 
Hess—whether a state may impose a duty to collect use tax upon 
a retailer that does not have a physical presence in the state.66
The Court’s opinion, delivered by Justice Stevens, first declared 
that “[t]he two constitutional requirements,” the Due Process 
Clause on the one hand and the dormant Commerce Clause on 
the other, “differ fundamentally.”67 For the first time, the Court 
58 See Gen. Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm’n of Iowa, 322 U.S. 335, 339–40 (1944) 
(Jackson, J., dissenting); Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344 (1954). 
59 Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 274–76 (1977). 
60 Id. at 275. 
61 Id. at 278. 
62 Id. at 287–89. 
63 Id. at 279 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 277–78, 287 (rationalizing the 
four-pronged test). 
64 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 480 (5th 
ed., 2015); see also Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 310 (1992). 
65 Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753, 758 (1967). 
66 Quill, 504 U.S. at 301–02. 
67 Id. at 305. 
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followed the distinction proposed by Justice Rutledge. 68  With 
regard to the Due Process Clause, by consulting the cases on 
judicial jurisdiction, the Court removed the element of physical 
presence in determining the link that justifies exercise of taxing 
power.69 In other words, it overruled Miller Bros., Scripto, and 
Bellas Hess in this regard.70 It concluded the collection duty in 
question did not conflict with the Due Process Clause.71
On the subject of the dormant Commerce Clause, Quill started 
from an analysis of the historical development of the cases.72 Then, 
it took the facts of Bellas Hess through the four-pronged test of 
Complete Auto and concluded:
Bellas Hess concerns the first of these tests and stands for the 
proposition that a vendor whose only contacts with the taxing State 
are by mail or common carrier lacks the “substantial nexus” required 
by the Commerce Clause.73
The Court contended that Bellas Hess created a bright-line 
rule, or a safe harbor, in the first prong of the four-pronged test, 
which itself is a pragmatic standard.74 Presumably it is difficult, 
if not impossible, to justify such a formalistic rule placed within a 
pragmatic standard from a policy standpoint. Therefore, Justice 
Stevens sought its foundation in “the doctrine and principles of 
stare decisis . . . .”75
In sum, through the general framework of the four-pronged 
test for state tax enunciated in Complete Auto,76 Quill placed the 
case law on the collection duty in the first prong of Complete 
Auto.77 However, whereas Complete Auto declined to follow the 
formalist approach of Spector78 in favor of a more substantial one, 
Quill kept a formalistic element in the first prong.79 Hence these 
decisions contain an implied conflict in their differing approaches. 
E. The Significance of Wayfair
The Court’s opinion in Wayfair, written by Justice Kennedy, 
at last rejected the physical presence rule formulated by Bellas 
68 Id. at 305–06 (citing Int’l Harvester Co. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340, 353 
(1944) (Rutledge, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
69 Id. at 307–08. 
70 Id. at 306–08. 
71 Id. at 308. 
72 Id. at 306–08. 
73 Id. at 311. 
74 Id. at 314–15. 
75 Id. at 317. 
76 See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977). 
77 Quill, 504 U.S. at 311–13. 
78 See generally Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O’Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951). 
79 Quill, 504 U.S. at 313. 
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Hess and Quill and overruled both cases.80 The Court presented five 
reasons in rejecting the rule. The first three reasons concerned 
Quill.81 First, the Court found that “the physical presence rule 
[was] not a necessary interpretation of” the first prong of the 
Complete Auto test.82 It was “a poor proxy for the compliance costs 
faced by companies that do business in multiple States.”83 Second, 
the Court noted that the rule distorted competition and worked as a 
tax shelter. 84  It disadvantaged local businesses and interstate 
businesses with a physical presence in the state.85 Third, the rule 
was at odds with the case-by-case approach of the Court’s dormant 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence.86 In addition, the Court pointed out 
that the application of the physical presence rule would be all the 
more inappropriate, given the advance of information technology in 
recent years.87 Lastly, the Court claimed that the rule created unfair 
and unjust consequences for all concerned actors.88
As previously mentioned, the extent of the taxing power of a 
state is demarcated by two considerations: One is the limit of tax 
jurisdiction itself, and the other is the effects of the exercise of 
the taxing power.89 The issue in Wayfair was the former. If, as 
Justice Rutledge had argued, the Due Process Clause exclusively 
dealt with the question of tax jurisdiction and, in contrast, the 
dormant Commerce Clause only with the question of the effects 
of the tax, Quill and Wayfair would not have been dormant 
Commerce Clause cases. In reality, Complete Auto kept the issue 
of jurisdiction within the ambit of the dormant Commerce 
Clause.90 Accordingly, Quill and Wayfair dealt with the collection 
duty under the dormant Commerce Clause. 91  Nevertheless, 
assuming that the issue should be dealt with under the dormant 
Commerce Clause, Wayfair correctly ruled by opting for a 
case-by-case analysis instead of a bright-line physical presence 
rule.92 However, Wayfair did not pay any attention to the fact 
that the tax liability in question was the collection duty of use 
80 South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2099 (2018).  
81 See id. at 2092. 
82 Id.
83 Id. at 2093. 
84 Id. at 2094. 
85 Id. at 2094–95. 
86 Id.
87 Id. at 2095. 
88 Id. at 2095–96. 
89 See supra Part I.A. 
90 Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 288 (1977). 
91 Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2087; Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 301 (1992).  
92 See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2094.  
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tax and that the economic burden of the tax itself was borne by 
consumers in the state.93
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on collection duty of 
state consumption tax at this moment might be summarized as 
follows: The dormant Commerce Clause has strictly limited state’s 
taxing power from both substantive and procedural aspects. In 
recent years, the substantive aspect has rarely been disputed in the 
context of state consumption taxes. But the second, third, and 
fourth prongs of the Complete Auto test will be applied to the cases 
on taxes.94 Procedurally, an exercise of taxing power out of the 
jurisdiction is prohibited. The first prong of the Complete Auto test 
exactly examines this aspect.95 Wayfair fine-tuned this examination 
by weighing physical elements to a lesser extent.96
II. TAX COMPETITION AMONG LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN JAPAN
A. Outline of the Tax System in Japan 
1. Local Governments in Japan 
Before referring to the tax system of Japan, this Article 
explains the basic structures of Japanese local governments. 
Japan is not a federal state—sovereignty is exclusively reserved 
for the national government. Japan’s Constitution simply 
requires that a local system be constituted under the principle of 
local autonomy. 97  It says little about organization of local 
governments. 98  The Local Autonomy Act of 1947 99  adopts a 
two-tiered local government structure: forty-seven prefectures 
and approximately 1700 municipalities. 100  The municipalities 
cover all of Japan’s territories.101 This structure means Japan does 
not have unincorporated areas.102 Even though prefectures do not 
have authority to control municipalities, all the municipalities 
belong to one of the prefectures.103 In other words, every person 
living in Japan belongs to one of the municipalities and one of the 
prefectures. With regard to the function performed by the 
93 See id. at 2088. 
94 Complete Auto Transit, 430 U.S. at 278. 
95 Id.
96 Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2093 (“Physical presence is not necessary to create a 
substantial nexus.”). 
97 NIHONKOKU KENPŻ [KENPŻ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 92. 
98 Id. at art. 93. 
99 Chihż jichi hż [Local Autonomy Act], Law No. 67 of 1947. 
100 ATSURO SASASKI, MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS & COMMC’NS, JAPAN, LOCAL
SELF-GOVERNMENT IN JAPAN 3 (2014). 
101 See id. at 5. 
102 KURT STEINER, LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN JAPAN 169 (1965). 
103 Chihż jichi hż [Local Autonomy Act], Law No. 67 of 1947, art. 5, para. 2. 
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governments, municipalities are far more important than 
prefectures. Municipalities (or basic local governments as they 
are sometimes called)104 play a major role in the everyday lives of 
its citizens.105 Under Articles 2(2) and 2(3) of the Local Autonomy 
Act of 1947, the national government delegates to municipalities 
the power to regulate “local affairs” [chiiki ni okeru jimu] and 
other specifically enumerated affairs.106 The role of prefectures in 
administering local affairs is subsidiary. Article 2(5) of the Act 
covers regional affairs, coordination of municipalities, and other 
affairs not appropriate for municipalities to administer.107 Even 
from these affairs, some are designated for delegation to midsized 
or large municipalities located in the prefecture.108
Then, after World War II, the Supreme Commander for the 
Allied Powers (“SCAP”) required delegation of a wide variety of 
regulatory power to local governments.109 As a result of major 
reforms of local governance during the past quarter century, 
municipalities acquired more power than before.110
2. Local Taxation in Japan111
The Constitution of Japan expresses nothing about the 
country’s tax system. It just declares that the payment of taxes is 
a duty of Japanese citizens112 and requires the Diet to implement 
tax laws.113 The substance of the tax system is entirely left to the 
Diet. With its broad authority, it chose a tax system that includes 
personal income tax, corporate income tax, inheritance tax, and 
value-added tax (“VAT”) as the source of revenue for the national 
government.114 The VAT system is a European-type value-added 
104 Id. at art. 2, para. 3. 
105 TOKYO METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT, The Structure of the Metropolitan 
Government, http://www.metro.tokyo.jp/ENGLISH/ABOUT/STRUCTSTR/structure01.htm 
[http://perma.cc/Z6BQ-HA9Z]. 
106 Id. at art. 2, paras. 2–3. The power to regulate “affairs” in Japanese local 
government law is identical to the “police power” in the U.S. law. See KURT STEINER, supra 
note 102, at 127–28. 
107 See Chihż jichi hż [Local Autonomy Act], Law No. 67 of 1947, art. 2, para. 5. 
108 Chihż jichi hż [Local Autonomy Act], Law No. 69 of 1946, art. 2, para. 4. 
109 See Terry MacDougall, Towards Political Inclusiveness: The Changing Role of Local 
Government in Japan, WORLD BANK INST. 1, 8 (2001), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/ 
en/268371468260928014/pdf/330440wbi37169.pdf [http://perma.cc/X47M-BH3R]. 
110 See HIROSHI IKAWA, NAT’L GRADUATE INST. FOR POLICY STUDIES, 15 YEARS OF 
DECENTRALIZATION REFORM IN JAPAN 8–9, 12–26, 28 (2008), www.jlgc.org.uk/en/pdfs/up-
to-date_en4.pdf [http://perma.cc/S9PP-4N54]. 
111 For additional information on the tax system in Japan, see generally HIROMITSU
ISHI, THE JAPANESE TAX SYSTEM (3d. ed. 2001). 
112 NIHONKOKU KENPŻ KENPŻ [KENPŻ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 30. 
113 Id. at art. 84. For the reader’s reference, the Diet is the national legislature of Japan. 
114 For background and additional commentary on the Japanese tax system, see
Tadao Okamura, The Japanese Tax System: Due Process and the Taxpayer, 11 BERKELEY
J. INT’L L. 125 (1993).  
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tax system, in which not only retailers, but also wholesalers 
cooperate in collecting the tax—unlike the American style sales 
tax, in which taxes are collected only by retailers.115 Some portion 
of the tax revenue from VAT is automatically sent to local 
governments.116  Local governments have personal income tax, 
corporate business/income taxes, and property tax as their own 
sources of revenue. 117  Local personal income tax and local 
corporate income tax make use of the tax base of national 
counterparts.118 Although they are not technically a surtax to the 
national income taxes, they are essentially constituents of 
national income taxes. Property tax is the only tax that is 
reserved for local governments. 
Up to this point, it appears that the tax jurisdiction is 
properly distributed among national and local governments. 
However, when the two levels of local governments—prefectures 
and municipalities—are taken into account, the tax revenue for 
the prefectures in rural areas tends to be insufficient as 
compared to urban areas. First, the local corporate income tax, 
which is the only major tax reserved exclusively for the 
prefectures, is highly volatile.119 In addition, in part because the 
tax is allocated according to the number of offices and employees, 
the revenue from the taxes is concentrated in the metropolitan 
prefectures, especially Tokyo prefecture.120
As explained in the previous section, local governments play 
a crucial role in administrating local and other affairs. However, 
the local tax revenue is far less than the necessary amount to 
make ends meet. To make up for the deficit, the national 
government allots “tax” to the local governments. In order to 
mitigate interference with the decision-making of the local 
governments, the total amount of the allotted tax is statutorily 
determined.121 The amount of allotted tax for a local government 
is calculated as follows: First, a standardized amount of expenditure 
is estimated from the population, the area, and other objective data 
of the local government.122  Next, a standardized amount of tax 
115 Id.
116 Chihż zei hż [Local Tax Act], Law No. 226 of 1950, art. 72-114; id. at art. 72-115. 
117 Id. at art. 4, para. 2 (prefectures); id. at art. 5, para. 2 (municipalities). 
118 Id. at art. 32 (prefectural personal income tax); id. at art. 23, para. 1, no. 3 
(prefectural corporate tax income); id. at art. 313 (municipal personal income tax); id. at 
art. 292, para. 1, no. 3 (municipal corporate income tax). 
119 See, e.g., EIJI TAJIKA & YUJI YUI, Fiscal Decentralization in Japan: Does it Harden 
the Budgets of Local Governments? in TACKLING JAPAN’S FISCAL CHALLENGES: STRATEGIES 
TO COPE WITH HIGH PUBLIC DEBT AND POPULATION AGING, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
126 (Keimi Kaizuka & Anne O. Krueger eds., 2006). 
120 See infra note 129, at 28–30. 
121 Chihż kżfuzei hż [Local Allocation Tax Act], Law No. 211 of 1950, art. 6. 
122 See id. at art. 10. 
2019] Tax Competition and the Dormant Commerce Clause 103 
revenue is estimated by taking three quarters of the estimated tax 
revenue of the local government. The amount of allocation tax will 
be the balance of the standardized amount expenditure and the 
standardized amount of revenue.123 A 25% percent discount gives 
local governments an incentive to increase their tax revenue as long 
as the estimated tax revenue does not exceed about 133% of the 
standardized amount of expenditure.124
3. Demarcation of Taxing Powers among Local Governments 
There is no constitutional doctrine that delineates tax 
jurisdictions of local governments in Japan. This is natural 
because Japan’s Constitution empowers the Diet to design the 
local government system. The national government delegates its 
taxing power to local governments as articulated by the Local Tax 
Act of 1950.125
Some insist that the Constitution guarantees local 
governments their own original power to tax. Surprisingly, a 
lower court decision in 1980 upheld the claim, although in 
dictum, by stating “such a statute that totally or virtually denies 
the taxing power of local governments is unconstitutional and 
void.”126 However, such a claim is ridiculous, to say the least. In 
the context of local governance, it is one thing to have a local 
government, but quite another that the government finances its 
resources only through its own tax revenue. Many countries, 
including Japan, transfer revenue between national/federal and 
local governments.127 And as the decision itself makes clear, the 
claim does not put forward a meaningful standard to decide 
whether a given level of fiscal independence of a local government 
is sufficient to make it constitutional. 
The Local Tax Act of 1950 does not contain any general 
provisions to limit local governments’ exercise of taxing power. 
Despite that, we rarely find disputes concerning tax competition 
among local governments.128
The main reason is that the Act meticulously articulates the 
tax base, tax rate, and other features of principal taxes. The local 
governments have little room for exercising their power to tax 
123 Chihż kżfuzei hż [Local Allocation Tax Act], Law No. 211 of 1950, art. 10. 
124 See id.
125 See Chihż zei hż [Local Tax Act], Law No. 226 of 1950, art. 2. 
126 Fukuoka Chihż Saibansho [Fukuoka Dist. Ct.] June 5, 1980, Omuta-shi [City of 
Omuta, Fukuoka] v. Kuni [The Government of Japan], 417 HANREI TAIMUZU [HANTA] 51, 60.  
127 See, e.g., Hansjörg Blöchliger & Claire Charbit, Fiscal Equalisation, 2008 OECD
J.: ECON. STUD., 265, 277 (2008). 
128 For additional information on the tax scheme of Japan, see generally 
KENICHIRO HARADA, COUNCIL OF LOCAL AUTHS. FOR INT’L RELATIONS, LOCAL 
TAXATION IN JAPAN (2009). 
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freely. However, the Act does give local governments three kinds 
of flexibility.129 First, the Act authorizes local governments to 
adopt higher tax rates that are different from the standard rate 
for any of the taxes. 130  Most of the prefectures use this 
“additional tax rate” [choka kazei] for prefectural per capita 
personal taxation, prefectural corporate per capita taxation, and 
prefectural corporate income taxation. Eight prefectures even use 
it for prefectural corporate business taxation. Some of the 
municipalities employ the additional tax rate for municipal 
corporate per capita taxation and municipal corporate income 
taxation. As of 2017, 153 out of 1719 municipalities apply 
additional tax rate on their local property tax. Whereas the 
standard rate for local property tax is 1.4 %, 141 municipalities 
apply a higher rate of 1.5%. 131
Second, the Act authorizes municipalities to reduce or 
increase tax liability for several enumerated properties. For 
example, municipalities may impose tax against power plants for 
renewable energy at a lower rate or a higher rate.132
Third, the Act gives local governments power to introduce 
“extra-statutory” taxes. The legal issues regarding this concept 
will be discussed below. For now, it is sufficient to understand 
that the tax revenue from these taxes is relatively limited.133
B. Extra-Statutory Taxation on Nuclear Plants 
1. Introduction 
Extra-statutory taxes are local taxes that a local government 
imposes without direct delegation from national legislation. They 
consist of two types of taxes. One is called an extra-statutory 
normal tax.134 The other is an extra-statutory earmarked tax, 
which was newly introduced in 2000.135 Most of the tax revenue 
of extra-statutory normal taxes is from taxes on nuclear fuel or 
other nuclear power related property.136 Most of the tax revenue 
129 Sżmushż jichi zeimu kyoku [MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND COMMC’NS,
LOCAL PUB. FIN. BUREAU], Chihou zeisei kankei shiryo [MATERIALS ON LOCAL TAX
SYSTEM] 34 (2018). 
130 Id.
131 Id. at 56.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Chihż zei hż [Local Tax Act], Law No. 226 of 1950, art. 4, para. 2, art. 5, para. 3 
(prefectures and municipalities). 
135 Id. at art. 4, para. 6, art. 5, para. 7 (prefectures and municipalities). 
136 HARADA, supra note 128, at 26. In the 2016 fiscal year, tax revenue from taxes 
related to nuclear plants were 39.3 billion yen out of the total tax revenue of 51.7 billion 
yen from extra-statutory normal taxes. MATERIALS ON LOCAL TAX SYSTEM, supra note 
131, at 37.  
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of extra-statutory earmarked taxes is from taxes on industrial 
wastes.137 This section uses taxes on nuclear fuel as an example 
in demonstrating certain defects of the Japanese local tax system. 
The origin of extra-statutory taxes lies in the practices in 
place in the pre-World War II era. Under the Ruling on Local Tax 
of 1880138 and the Act on Local Tax of 1926,139 there were many 
kinds of taxes imposed by local governments. At that time, the 
national statutes allowed prefectures to impose original taxes 
[zasshu zei]. However, these taxes greatly hindered smooth 
commerce between localities. The Local Tax Act of 1940 140
conditioned municipalities’ introduction of an independent tax 
[dokuritsu zei] other than those enumerated in the Act, on the 
permission of the Minister of Internal Affairs141 and the Minister 
of Finance. The Act abolished the original taxes and prohibited 
prefectures from imposing unenumerated independent taxes. After 
World War II, revisions to the Act in 1946 granted prefectures 
authority to impose unenumerated independent taxes. 142  The 
present Act, the Local Tax Act of 1950, renamed them 
extra-statutory taxes and allowed all local governments to adopt 
one under the permission [kyoka] of the Minister of Home 
Affairs. 143  The Act stipulated five conditions for the 
permission: actual existence of the source of revenue in the 
jurisdiction; demand for revenue sufficient to justify the proposed 
tax; the tax base is not the same as national taxes or other local 
taxes and imposition of the tax does not excessively burden the 
residents; the taxation does not greatly impede the commerce 
between the local governments; and the taxation must be 
appropriate from the perspective of the national government’s 
economic policy.144
In 2000, as a part of a major reform of the local government 
system, the Diet gave local governments more discretion in 
levying extra-statutory taxes.145 The revision of the Act in 2000 
137 HARADA, supra note 128, at 26. In the 2016 fiscal year, tax revenue from taxes 
related to industrial wastes were 6.6 billion yen out of the total tax revenue of 10.1 billion 
yen from extra-statutory earmarked taxes. MATERIALS ON LOCAL TAX SYSTEM, supra note 
131, at 37. 
138 Chihż zei kisoku [Rulings on Local Tax], Decree of the Cabinet No. 16 of 1880. 
139 Chihż zei ni kansuru hżritsu [Act on Local Tax], Law No. 24 of 1926. 
140 Chihż zei hż [Local Tax Act], Law No. 60 of 1940.  
141 The Ministry of Internal Affairs was later reorganized as the Ministry of Home 
Affairs and then the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. See NOBUKI 
MOCHIDA, FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION AND LOCAL PUBLIC FINANCE IN JAPAN 10 (2008). 
142 The Local Tax Act of 1948 also authorized local governments to impose 
unenumerated independent taxes. See Chihż zei hż [Local Tax Act], Law No. 110 of 1948, 
art. 46, para. 2, and art. 103, paras. 2 and 3. 
143 See generally Chihż zei hż [Local Tax Act], Law No. 226 of 1950. 
144 Id.
145 See HARADA, supra note 128, at 25. 
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replaced the permission by the Minister with his “consent” 
[dżi] to the proposal of a new tax.146 And the Act required the 
Minister to consent to the proposal when the statutory conditions 
are met. The Act also dropped the first two conditions in the 
previous statute.147 The 2004 revision of the Act imposed upon the 
local government a duty to ask for opinions of the taxpayers in 
proposing a new extra-statutory tax when the number of potential 
taxpayers is small and therefore only these taxpayers are supposed 
to bear heavy burden of the tax.148
2. The Advent of the Nuclear Fuel Taxes 
The first local government that introduced nuclear fuel tax was 
the Fukui prefecture. The prefecture has had several nuclear 
reactors in the territory since 1970.149 In the new year’s greeting of 
1972, Heidayƈ Nakagawa, then the Governor of the prefecture, 
revealed his plan to launch a new extra-statutory tax on nuclear 
power plants.150 His proposal was to reduce the profits of power 
companies and to transfer the amount reduced to the prefecture in 
which power plants were located. 151  Soon thereafter, then 
Prime Minister, Kakuei Tanaka, submitted an idea of new 
national tax on power plants. His idea became a tax for 
promotion of power-resources development.152 The tax encourages 
local governments to accept power plants, including nuclear power 
plants.153 The tax base of this tax is wholesale electric energy. The 
tax revenue from the tax is allocated to local governments as a 
subsidy.154 However, like any other subsidy, the allocated funds are 
earmarked for limited power plant-related purposes. In light of such 
inconveniences inherent in the national tax and the accompanying 
subsidy, some local governments still wished for tax revenue from 
146 See id.
147 See id.
148 Chihż zei hż [Local Tax Act], Law No. 226 of 1950, art. 259, para. 2; art. 669, para. 
2; art. 731, para. 3. 
149 For background information of the reactors, see J. Mark Ramseyer, Nuclear 
Reactors in Japan: Who Asks for Them, What Do They Do? (Harvard Law Sch. John 
M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econs., and Bus., Discussion Paper No. 909, 2017),  
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2986410. 
150 Hatsuden zei shinsetsu wo junbi [Preparing for Electricity Tax], YOMIURI-SHIMBUN,
Jan. 5, 1972, at 2. 
151 Id.
152 Dengen kaihatsu sokushin zei ho [Act on Tax for Promotion of Power-Resources 
Development], Law No. 79 of 1974. 
153 Needless to say, the tax is one of the incentives the Japanese national government 
offers to local governments. For the analysis of these incentives, see J. Mark Ramseyer, Why 
Power Companies Build Nuclear Reactors on Fault Lines: The Case of Japan, 13 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 457, 459, 479, 481 (2012), which points out that people rationally 
built nuclear power plants on fault lines. 
154 See Hiroshi Onitsuka, Hooked on Nuclear Power: Japanese State-Local Relations 
and the Vicious Cycle of Nuclear Dependence, 10 ASIA-PAC. J. 1, 7 (2012). 
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an extra-statutory tax. Because the tax base of an extra-statutory 
tax must not “be the same as existing national taxes or other 
local taxes,” taxing electric energy, which is already the object of 
the tax for promotion of power-resources development, does not 
seem to pass muster.155 Nevertheless, in 1976, the Minister of 
Home Affairs permitted the proposal of nuclear fuel tax by Fukui 
prefecture.156 The prefecture played a little trick here. It chose as 
the object of the tax the supply of nuclear fuel into the reactor.157
The tax base is the price of the fuel. It thus avoided conflict 
with the statutory condition. It is unclear what sort of political 
negotiations occurred, however, it is reasonable to infer that 
the permission by the Minister originated not from mere 
interpretation of the Local Tax Act, but rather from some highly 
political considerations. 
Having permitted the new tax of Fukui prefecture, the 
Minister was forced to permit other prefectures to impose 
identical or similar taxes: Fukushima (1977), Ibaraki (1978), 
Ehime (1979), Saga (1979), Shimane (1980), Shizuoka (1980), 
Kagoshima (1983), Miyagi (1983), Niigata (1984), Hokkaido 
(1988), Ishikawa (1992), and Aomori (2004) followed Fukui in 
imposing an extra-statutory tax on nuclear fuel.158 All these taxes 
were valid for a limited time and have been subsequently 
renewed several times.159
3. The 2011 Fukushima Disaster and Its Effects on Nuclear 
Fuel Taxes 
On March 11, 2011, a tsunami caused by a powerful earthquake 
hit the coasts of Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima prefectures. 160
Consequently, the nuclear reactors’ cores at the Fukushima Daiichi 
[Number One] power plant began to melt.161 The power plant was 
closed, and the operations of all the other nuclear power plants were 
temporarily suspended. This essentially meant that the object of 
155 See THE ASAHI SHIMBUN, Aug. 22, 1976, at 3.  
156 Fukui ken kakunenryo zei jorei [Ordinance on the Nuclear Fuel Tax of Fukui 
Prefecture], Ordinance (Fukui Prefecture) No. 40 of 1976. 
157 See Norihiko Kuwabara & Takufumi Yoshida, Prefectures taxing nuclear plants until 
the bitter end, THE ASAHI SHIMBUN (June 22, 2018), http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/ 
AJ201806220038.html [http://perma.cc/N3SU-CPXJ].
158 GREEN TAXATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY 219 (Larry Kreiser et al. 
eds., 2012). 
159 See id.
160 Kenneth Pletcher & John P. Rafferty, Japan Earthquake and Tsumani of 2011,
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (last updated Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.britannica.com/ 
event/Japan-earthquake-and-tsunami-of-2011 [http://perma.cc/NUT9-47K2]. 
161 See Fukushima Daiichi Accident, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N (last updated Oct. 2018), 
http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/safety-and-security/safety-of-plants/ 
fukushima-accident.aspx [http://perma.cc/8JCT-E5WG].  
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nuclear fuel taxes did not exist anymore. The prefectures suddenly 
lost all tax revenue.162
This incident changed the prefectures’ policy on nuclear fuel 
taxes. As one consequence, Fukushima prefecture did not renew 
its ordinance on nuclear fuel tax and the ordinance lost its effect 
at the end of 2012.163
Further, other prefectures, having been dependent on the 
revenue from nuclear fuel taxes for a long time, sought means to 
collect money even when the reactors were shut down.164  They 
revised the ordinances and began to impose a tax on the “business 
regarding operation and decommissioning of nuclear reactors.”165
Technically speaking, they modified the ordinances to make part of 
the tax base calculated on the thermal power [netsu shutsuryoku] of 
the reactors. Take Hokkaido (a prefecture) as an example, which 
has imposed this tax on Hokkaido Electric Power Company since 
September 2013. 166  The tax base is 5960 MW, the sum of the 
thermal power of the three reactors located in Tomari Power Plant, 
which is the only nuclear power plant in Hokkaido.167 The tax rate 
is 37,750 yen per MW for three months.168 Hence the annual tax 
revenue is 900 million yen. 
Some prefectures began to impose other kinds of taxes on 
nuclear power plants. Three prefectures, Fukui, Ibaraki, and 
Aomori, levy taxes on power companies or reprocessing businesses 
for their imports and storage of spent nuclear fuel. The Aomori 
prefecture is the most conspicuous in this regard. The tax revenue 
from the tax on the handling of nuclear fuel materials [kakunenryo 
busshitsu to toriatukai zei] was a little less than 20 billion yen in 
2016.169 It reached nearly twenty percent of the 115 billion yen of 
162 Kuwabara & Yoshida, supra note 157. 
163 Yuhei Sato, the Governor of Fukushima prefecture, emphasized that the tax policy is 
consistent with the prefecture’s demand for nuclear decommissioning. See Fukushima to Ax 
Nuclear Fuel Tax, JAPAN TIMES (Nov. 21, 2012), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/11/21/ 
national/fukushima-to-ax-nuclear-fuel-tax/#.W7GYgy-ZM6W [http://perma.cc/4REG-VP45].  
164 Kuwabara & Yoshida, supra note 157. 
165 See Fukui ken kakunenryo zei jorei [Ordinance on the Nuclear Fuel Tax of Fukui 
Prefecture], Ordinance (Fukui Prefecture) No. 30 of 2016, art. 5, no. 2 (referring to both 
operation and decommissioning). Cf. Hokkaido kakunenryo zei jorei [Ordinance on the 
Nuclear Fuel Tax of Hokkaido], Ordinance (Hokkaido) No. 8 of 2013, art. 4 (referring only 
to operation of nuclear reactors). 
166 Kyodo, Hokkaido Electric to Execute Second Price Hike, JAPAN TIMES (Oct. 10, 2014), 
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/10/10/business/hokkaido-electric-execute-second-
price-hike-november/#.XBsLfS2ZPOQ [http://perma.cc/FK3P-PE3A]. 
167 See HOKKAIDO ELECTRIC POWER CO., INC., http://www.hepco.co.jp/energy/atomic/ 
data/specification.html [http://perma.cc/L2K3-FK5Z]. 
168 See NUCLEAR FUEL TAX (last updated Aug. 28, 2018), http://www.pref.hokkaido.lg.jp/ 
sm/zim/tax/atom01.htm [http://perma.cc/5U8V-DKPQ]. 
169 Id.
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the prefecture’s tax revenue, excluding the amount of allocated 
consumption tax.170
4. A Critical Appraisal of the Control on Extra-Statutory 
Taxes 
a. The Nuclear Fuel Taxes and the Political Process 
The nuclear fuel taxes are a mechanism used to incentivize 
local governments to accept nuclear power plants. Mark Ramseyer 
persuasively described the dynamics in which poor villages 
rationally, but shortsightedly, ask for subsidies at the cost of being 
the permanent location for nuclear power plants, which eventually 
render them unable to break from the resulting vicious cycle.171
Admittedly, in analyzing nuclear fuel taxes thoroughly, the political 
process should be taken into consideration. Nevertheless, it is worth 
noting the defects of the Local Tax Act, particularly how its 
standards limit the taxing power of local governments. Even if 
certain transfers of wealth from a party to another should be 
considered desirable in the political process, it would not be 
achieved as the form of local tax had the national legislation strictly 
dismissed the alternative. 
b. A Comparison with the Dormant Commerce Clause in 
the United States 
This section identifies the problem with nuclear fuel taxes 
from the legal perspective. Next, this section examines which part 
of the Local Tax Act has given rise to such problems by comparing 
the statute with dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence in the 
United States. 
There are several problems with nuclear fuel taxes. The first is 
that their essential qualities are far from apparent. Particularly, it 
is not clear who the legislators intended to have bear the burden of 
the taxes. The power companies, or their shareholders, may be the 
tax bearers. Or it may also be the consumers of the electricity. 
However, because the taxes are considered to be the costs calculated 
in the electricity rates, it would be reasonable to assume that the 
consumers bear the tax burden.172
Second, since the consumers bear the tax burden, those who 
are subject to the taxes were never involved in determining the 
tax legislation. Nor do the consumers have any means to dispute 
170 Financial Situation, AOMORI PREFECTURAL GOV’T. (last updated Nov. 2, 2018), 
https://www.pref.aomori.lg.jp/soshiki/soumu/zeimu/files/H28_kenzei.pdf [http://perma.cc/3VAT-4BFX].  
171 Ramseyer, supra note 153. 
172 See Kuwabara & Yoshida, supra note 157. 
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the legality of the taxes against either the Local Tax Act or other 
national legislation. 
Third, there is a problem with the recent modification of the 
taxes. All prefectures, other than Fukushima, revised their 
ordinances and began to impose taxes on the power companies, 
even when those companies do not operate nuclear reactors.173
Because the reactors generate no electricity, such a tax cannot be 
a consumption tax (the economic burden of which would be borne 
by the consumers of electricity). However, neither the prefectures 
nor the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications give 
any reasoned explanation for this. In any case, it would be quite 
unreasonable to impose a fixed consumption tax irrespective of 
the level of consumption. The modification of the taxes has 
revealed that they are no more than simply a means to obtain a 
subsidy, as long as the nuclear power plants are located in their 
territories and there is no sensible justification for the taxes. 
It is easy to see these problems stem from the absence of a 
Japanese equivalent to the dormant Commerce Clause. If Japan 
had a dormant Commerce Clause, it would have been possible to 
examine the validity of the nuclear fuel taxes using a test similar 
to the Complete Auto test. 174  For instance, the tax might be 
invalidated because it is not fairly related to the services the 
prefecture provides.175 The tax on imports of spent nuclear fuel 
might conflict with the prohibition of discrimination against 
out-of-state actors.176 In fact, as previously noted, the Local Tax 
Act needs only three requirements for the consent of the Minister 
of Internal Affairs and Communications.177 These requirements 
do not allow for the invalidation of a tax that would harm the 
local tax system or domestic commerce.  
Furthermore, there are at least two other serious defects in 
the Act. First, it is not clear when taxation against consumers 
outside the territory of the local governments is allowed, if at all. 
The Act provides that the source of income and location of the 
property must be within the territory before imposing taxes on 
income or property. 178  However, it does not spell out what 
principle governs the consumption taxes. Second, the Act says 
nothing about indirect taxes. The duty to ask for opinions of 
taxpayers, introduced by the revision of the Act in 2004, has 
173 See id.
174 See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
175 See id.
176 See id.
177 See HARADA, supra note 128, at 25. 
178 Chihż zei hż [Local Tax Act], Law No. 226 of 1950, art. 262, 672, & 733-2. 
2019] Tax Competition and the Dormant Commerce Clause 111 
nothing to do with the indirect taxes because the economic burden 
of them would be borne by people different from the taxpayers. 
Let us go back to Wayfair now. In the cases on the collection 
duty of state use tax in the United States, the consumers within the 
state are the ones who bear the economic burden of the use tax.179
The issue is whether the retailer that seems to have a scarce 
connection with the state is nevertheless obligated to collect tax 
from those consumers. In contrast, the nuclear fuel taxes in Japan 
are imposed on the power companies that have power plants in the 
territory of the local government. However, the tax burden is shifted 
to the consumers out of the territory. Both countries struggle in 
dealing with indirect consumption taxes. In the United States, by 
taking only the taxpayer into account, the fair apportionment of tax 
burden among the consumers in the state has failed, although 
Wayfair has mitigated the problem.180 In Japan, by disregarding the 
consumers who bear the tax, the nuclear fuel taxes were 
implemented as an indirect vehicle for tax collection. 
C. The “Hometown Tax Donation” System 
1. Introduction 
During the past decade, taxpayers’ attitudes towards Japanese 
local income taxation have drastically changed. The change was 
prompted by a newly-introduced tax credit regarding donations. 
Since the tax credit’s introduction in 2008, competition for donations 
among municipalities and prefectures has gradually accelerated 
through their offers of goods and services in return for donations.181
This section will examine how the tax credit, and resulting 
behaviors of both local governments and taxpayers, can be seen as 
another example of how the local tax system in Japan is defective. 
In Japan, local governments and the national government 
impose income taxes on their residents. Whereas there are many 
statutory provisions for the national income tax182 and a large 
number of officials managing the national tax system, there are 
very few statutory provisions for local income taxes, with only a 
small number of officials hired to implement them. The reason 
for this is that local governments are largely dependent on the 
179 See, e.g., Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 302 (1992). 
180 See generally South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018). 
181 See Tomohiro Osaki, Hometown ‘tax’ donations system catching on, JAPAN TIMES
(Oct. 20, 2014), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/10/20/reference/hometown-tax-
donations-system-catching/#.W9jKBXpKiu4 [http://perma.cc/S5RT-CRFX]. 
182 See Shotoku zei hǀ [Income Tax Act], Law No. 33 of 1965. 
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computation of income generated by the national income tax.183
By referring to the tax base of the national income tax for the 
previous year, the local income taxes barely require their own 
computation process. 
In spite of almost the same computation process, officials 
from the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications have 
forcefully insisted over time that the nature of the local income 
taxes is different from that of the national income tax.184 They 
assert that the local income taxes represent the principle of fair 
share [futan bun-nin], one of the most important ideas in local 
taxation.185 According to them, although this principle guides the 
entire local tax system, it is especially prominent for local income 
taxes because it justifies local governments’ taxation against 
low-income people who are exempt from national income. The 
principle has also been referred to in justifying the fact that 
deductions and credits for various policy purposes are strictly 
limited in the local income taxes. 
The local governments impose two kinds of “inhabitant taxes” 
[jumin zei] on individuals. One is per capita tax [kinto wari] on 
residents and nonresidents that have local establishments, such as 
land and buildings in the territory.186 However, the amount and the 
significance of the per capita taxes is very small today. The other 
inhabitant tax is the local income taxes [shotoku wari] on the 
residents. These taxes are important in terms of their tax 
revenue.187 They consist of the prefectural income tax and the 
municipal income tax.188 The tax base for these taxes is almost 
the same as that for the national income tax. The standard tax 
rate189 is four percent for the prefectural income tax190 and six 
percent for the municipal income tax.191
183 Chihż zei hż [Local Tax Act], Law No. 226 of 1950, art. 32 (prefectural personal 
income tax); id. at art. 23, para. 1, no. 3 (prefectural corporate income tax); id. at art. 
313 (municipal personal income tax); id. at art. 292, para. 1, no. 3 (municipal corporate 
income tax). 
184 See generally Takeo Yamauchi, “Kojin jumin zei no seikaku” ni kansuru ichi 
kousatsu: “futan bun-nin” no imisuru mono (1) [A Consideration on the “Nature of 
Inhabitant Taxes”: What “Fair Share” Means, Part I], 71 JICHI KENKYU 77, 80–85, 87–91 
(1995) (showing an overview of the discourse on the principles of local taxation including 
the principle of “fair share”). 
185 See TAX BUREAU, MINISTRY OF FIN., AN OUTLINE OF JAPANESE TAXES: 2001-2002,
16 (2002). 
186 The per capita taxes are also imposed on corporations and other entities that have 
establishments or dormitories in the territory of the local government. See Local Tax Act, 
Law No. 226 of 1950, art. 23, para. 1, no. 1; art. 24, para. 1, no. 1 & 2; art. 292, para. 1, 
no. 1; art. 294, para. 1, no. 1 & 2.  
187 See AN OUTLINE OF JAPANESE TAXES: 2001-2002, supra note 185, at 18. 
188 See id.
189 The “standard tax rate” is the tax rate local governments apply under ordinary 
circumstances. However, the Act does not admit local governments to apply different 
rates for the local individual income taxes. 
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2. Transformation of the Local Income Taxes in the Past 
Decade 
a. An Introduction of Tax Credits for the Donation to 
Other Local Public Bodies 
The 2008 revision to the Local Tax Act192 drastically changed 
tax rules for donations, especially for donations to prefectures 
and municipalities other than the one in which the taxpayer’s 
residence is located. The “hometown tax donation [furusato 
nozei]” system,193 introduced by the revision, in essence expanded 
tax benefits for the taxpayers who made donations to local 
governments.194 Before the revision, the amount of donation to 
local governments exceeding 5000 yen was deducted from income 
for the purpose of calculating the national income tax. 195
Deduction from the local income taxes was allowed only if the 
amount of donation exceeds 100,000 yen. The tax revision newly 
allowed a tax credit against local income tax liability for ten 
percent of the amount of donation if it exceeds 5000 yen. Given 
the fact that the aggregate tax rate of the local income taxes is 
ten percent, this tax credit means that the rate of local income 
taxes is zero for the amount of donations. Therefore, it is the 
same as a deduction of the amount of donations from taxable 
income. Furthermore, the revision offers another benefit to those 
who make donations to municipalities and prefectures. A new tax 
credit not exceeding one-tenth of the taxpayer’s local income tax 
liability is granted for the amount of the donation.196 Combined 
with the previously mentioned income deduction and tax credit, 
this “special” tax credit allowed a taxpayer who pays a fee of 5000 
yen to transfer the amount equivalent to ten percent of his local 
income tax liability to whichever municipalities or prefectures he 
190 Local Tax Act, Law No. 226 of 1950, art. 35, para. 1. 
191 Id. at art. 314-3, para. 1. 
192 Local Tax Act, Law No. 21 of 2008. See Tomoyuki Saisu, Chihozeiho to no kaisei [The 
Revisions on the Local Tax Act], Heisei 20 nen zeisei kaisei no kaisetsu [EXPLANATIONS ON 
THE 2008 TAX REVISION], 647–49 (2008). 
193 Technically speaking, the Japanese phrase “furusato nozei” connotes that the taxpayers 
“pay tax” to municipalities and prefectures and not that they “donate” money to these. However, 
we adopt here “hometown tax donation” as the translation of “furusato nozei” because it seems to 
be the official translation. See, e.g., The Furusato Nozei Program: Tax Breaks with Benefits,
TOKYO WEEKENDER (Mar. 20, 2016), https://www.tokyoweekender.com/2016/03/the-furusato-
nozei-program-tax-breaks-with-benefits/ [http://perma.cc/UYW9-PW3R]. 
194 For articles on the hometown tax donation system written in English, see Anthony 
Rausch, A Paradox of Japanese Taxation: Analyzing the Furusato Nozei Tax System, 15 
ASIA-PAC. J. JAPAN FOCUS 1, 1 (2017) and Janet W. Kanzawa, Lobsters, Hot Air Balloons, 
and the Hometown Tax: A Japanese Model for Revitalizing Rural Economies in the United 
States, 2017 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1100, 1100 (2017). 
195 Income Tax Act, Law No. 33 of 1965, art. 78. The 2006 tax revision had reduced 
the minimum amount from 10,000 yen to 5000 yen. Id. 
196 Local Tax Act, Law No. 226 of 1950, art. 37-2, para. 2, and art. 314-7, para. 2. 
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or she chooses. In essence, by paying 5000 yen, a taxpayer 
obtains the right to make his donation to local governments a 
substitute for his tax payment.197
The report prepared by the committee of experts on local 
governance offers two justifications for the hometown tax 
donation system.198 One is that a taxpayer should be allowed to 
pay tax to his own hometown municipality or prefecture from 
which he has benefited in his or her younger years. In other 
words, the donation is a deferred payment of consideration for 
past public services. The other is that the system acts as an 
incentive for municipalities and prefectures to compete to provide 
better public services, not only to their own residents, but also to 
other citizens as a whole. This explanation expects that the 
amount of donations a local government assembles would stand 
for the popularity of the policies it chooses. In other words, it 
hopes for a taxpayer—instead of a consumer-voter in the Tiebout 
model—to pick a local government which best satisfies his or her 
preference pattern for public goods.199
A disparity of tax revenue among municipalities and 
prefectures is in the background of the hometown tax donation 
system.200 Local governments in the urban and industrial area 
such as the Tokyo prefecture and the city of Nagoya have a large 
amount of tax revenue from the local income tax, especially the 
local corporate income tax.201 Conversely, those in rural areas have 
difficulty making ends meet and are heavily dependent upon “local 
allocation tax [chiho kofu zei]” from the central government.202
Accordingly, amelioration of the imbalance was one of the main 
motives for the idea of hometown tax donation. However, it 
entirely fails to accomplish this purpose. There is no assurance 
that the taxpayers will act optimally in order to transfer the tax 
197 For a discussion of this system, see Hometown tax donation system, JAPAN 
TIMES (Mar. 11, 2017), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2017/03/11/editorials/review-
of-the/#.XB159C2ZPOQ [http://perma.cc/2KJ9-XDH7]. 
198 For an analysis, see Hideaki Sato, “Furusato nozei kenkyukai hokokusho” to 
Furusato nozei seido [“The Report of the Committee on Hometown Tax Donation” and the 
System of Hometown Tax Donation], 1366 JURISUTO 157 (2008) (containing the explanations 
of a member of the committee for the report). 
199 See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON.
416, 417–18 (1956) (proposing a model in which a consumer in a given municipality, 
instead of voting to change the policy of the community, physically moves to another 
municipality for policy that best satisfies his preference for public goods). 
200 Takuji Koike, Chiho zaisei kaikaku to zeishu no chiiki-kan kakusa [The Reform of 
Local Public Finance and the Disparity of Tax Revenue Among Localities], 593 CHŻSA TO 
JOHŻ 1 (2007). 
201 See James Mayger & Hannah Dormido, The Rich are Getting Richer in Abe’s Japan,
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 13, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2017-japan-inequality/. 
202 See JURO TERANISHI, EVOLUTION OF THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM IN JAPAN 46, 207 (2005). 
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revenue from the rich local governments to the poor local 
governments at the appropriate level. 
For the purpose of the calculation of local allocation tax, the 
amount of a donation is deducted from the tax revenue of the 
residence municipalities/prefectures, but is not added to the tax 
revenue of the receiving municipalities/prefectures.203 The rule 
means that the reduction of tax revenue for a local government 
caused by the resident’s donation to other local governments is 
considerably supplemented by an increase in the amount of local 
allocation tax.204
b. The Emergence of “Governmental” Tax Shelters 
through Rewards to the Donation 
Even though many might have considered the idea of 
hometown tax donation attractive, only a small number of 
taxpayers dared to disburse 5000 yen to donate to other local 
governments. Most taxpayers’ indifference was reasonable. They 
had no motive at all to make donations to local governments when 
they do not enjoy the benefit from the donation in a tangible form. 
It is worth noting that, after the earthquake and tsunami of 2011, 
some funds were sent through the system of hometown tax 
donation to the local governments that were affected. 205  This 
incident, however, did not accelerate the use of the system at a 
significant degree. As a result, the legislators then dropped the 
cost for the taxpayers from 5000 yen to 2000 yen in 2012. 206
However, the effect of this revision was also limited. 
Then, several municipalities started to “reward” the donation, 
which gradually changed the state of affairs. Since 2012, with the 
help of web portals created by enterprises such as Trustbank 
(furusato choice), Rakuten (Rakuten furusato nozei), i-mobile 
(furunavi), Satofull, a subsidiary of Softbank (Satofull), JTB 
(furupo), All Nippon Airways (ANA no furusato nozei), etc., the 
amount of hometown tax donation saw an upsurge.207
The fair market value of the reward to the donation seems to 
be about half of the amount of donation on average, though it 
203 Saisu, supra note 192, at 649. 
204 See Masakatsu Misumi, Jiko futan naki “kifu” no arikata ga towareru “furusato 
nozei” [Hometown Tax Donation: A Questionable “Donation” without Real Burden], 371 
RIPPŻ TO CHŻSA 59, 70 (2015) (explaining in figure 14 the economic burden of actors with 
respect to hometown tax donation). 
205 See Osaki, supra note 181. 
206 See Hometown tax donation system, supra note 197. 
207 The names of the services they provide are indicated in the parentheses. 
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depends on the policy of each local government.208 For example, 
according to the Satofull website, the market value of the reward 
given by Ureshino city in the Saga prefecture is almost fifty 
percent of the amount of donation: A bottle of sake brewed in the 
city under the brand of “Azumacho,” the market price of which is 
5400 yen including VAT at eight percent, is on the list to choose 
from for those who have made 10,000 yen of donation. 209
Similarly, a set of six plates of porcelain and a dice made of 
porcelain manufactured in a pottery in the city, the market price 
of which is 10,800 yen including VAT, is on the list for those who 
have contributed 20,000 yen as hometown tax donation.210
The upsurge of the amount of donations in 2014 prompted 
those municipalities and prefectures that have been reluctant to 
introduce rewards for the hometown tax donation to join the 
competition for donation. If a local government restrained itself 
from offering rewards, it would continue to lose tax revenue from 
its residents’ donation to other local governments. The 2014 tax 
revision spurred the race by raising the maximum amount of the 
“special” tax credit from ten percent of his local income tax 
liability to twenty percent.211 It also simplified the procedure for 
making the hometown tax donation by exempting most taxpayers 
from the duty of filing their tax returns, who previously had to 
file them only for the purpose of the donation. 
As previously explained, the original intent of the hometown 
tax donation system was just to allow taxpayers to choose local 
governments to which they pay their local income taxes and, by 
doing so, to alleviate the disproportionate financing ability among 
the local governments to a certain degree. However, emergence of 
the practice of rewards and accompanying popularity of the system 
208 For an analysis of the state of affairs in 2018, see Taro Hagami, Furusato nozei 
sontoku kanjo wasuto besuto 50 [Profit and Loss from the Hometown Tax Donation: The 
Top 50 and the Bottom 50 Municipalities], 1614 CHƇŻ KŻRON 154 (2018). 
209 Saga ken Ureshino shi [Ureshino City, Saga], Junmai daiginjo homon azumacho 1.8L,
SATOFULL, https://www.satofull.jp/products/detail.php?product_id=1000943 
[http://perma.cc/A4MM-Q4FB] (offering a sake bottle of “Junmai daiginjo homon azumacho” as 
the reward for a 10,000 yen donation). Cf. Homon azumacho junmai daiginjo 1.8L, SAITO 
SHOTEN, http://www.saito-sake.com/shopdetail/005002000001/ [http://perma.cc/PS7L-XVR4] 
(selling the same sake bottle at a liquor shop for 5400 yen via the internet). 
210 Saga ken Ureshino shi [Ureshino City, Saga], Hizen yoshida yaki ji no 
sakazuki yojo han shuki setto, SATOFULL, https://www.satofull.jp/products/ 
detail.php?product_id=1013293 [http://perma.cc/CF6Y-6U8Y] (offering a set of six plates of 
porcelain and a dice made of porcelain as the reward for a 20,000 yen donation). 
Cf. Tsujiyo seitojo yojo han shuki, JI NO SAKAZUKI, https://jinosakazuki.thebase.in/items/3290714 
[http://perma.cc/AT5Q-J2GJ] (selling the same porcelain and dice set at a local pottery shop for 
10,800 yen via the internet). 
211 See Takuya Shimomura, Chihozeiho to no kaisei [The Revisions on The Local 
Tax Act], Heisei 27 nen zeisei kaisei no kaisetsu [Explanations on the 2015 Tax 
Revision], 932–36 (2015). 
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gave the system an unexpected role. It has turned into means to 
vitalize local economy. To reward donors, local governments now 
have to purchase their local goods and services from businesses in 
their territories. And it is natural for the legislators to reinforce this 
excellent method of subsidizing local governments that try hard to 
vitalize their local businesses. 
3. A Critical Appraisal of the Policy 
To evaluate the hometown donation system precisely, we have to 
know who the system benefits and who bears its costs. While credible 
data is not available, this section considers two possibilities. 
At one extreme, the taxpayer who makes a donation might 
not change his or her consumption patterns at all. He or she may 
just reduce purchase of consumption goods and acquire them as 
the rewards for the donation. In this case, the tax donation 
system works as an offer of tax reduction. The system is nothing 
but a tax shelter benefiting the taxpayer.212 In this setting, all 
the benefit from the system is absorbed by the taxpayer and the 
local government. The system will not be beneficial to local 
businesses to any extent because, as the sales of the goods to the 
local government increase through the reward to the donation, 
the sales to the consumers will decrease. 
However, it is unrealistic to suppose the taxpayers will not 
change their consumption patterns at all. Presumably, the taxpayers 
will change the goods or services they consume. Therefore, at the 
other extreme, they might keep their previous consumption patterns 
and acquire additional goods and services through the donation tax 
system. To the extent they increase consumption, the system might 
be justified as a tool for stimulating the domestic economy.  
Yet as far as the newly acquired goods and services through 
the hometown tax system replace the previously consumed goods 
and services, the system together with the rewards might distort 
the market economy. If the goods and services the taxpayers 
have formerly consumed have been produced in one municipality, 
then the system merely substitutes them with those produced in 
the other municipality at the expense of the national treasury. 
Obviously, encouraging such a zero-sum game is not a reasonable 
policy. If the goods and services have been imported from abroad, 
then the system is nothing more than subsidies to the domestic 
212 An opportunity of investment for taxpayers the expected return of which is positive 
after tax, which is normally contrived and sold by financial institutions, is known as a “tax 
shelter.” A donation to local public bodies under the hometown tax donation system is nothing 
but a tax shelter, even though the local governments instead of financial institutions offer the 
chance for it. 
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industries. In sum, the hometown tax donation system possibly 
harms the domestic and international commerce as a whole, even 
if it effectively energizes the economy in some local governments 
of Japan. It benefits local businesses at the sacrifice of the 
businesses out of the territory. 
If Japan had a dormant Commerce Clause, the rewards for the 
donation would be invalidated because they unquestionably disturb 
the domestic commerce. The Clause would invalidate them because 
the burdens on the domestic commerce outweigh the overall 
benefits of the policy. In addition, although it might be difficult to 
argue that the rewards discriminate out-of-staters, they directly 
harm other local governments. In reality, none of the articles in the 
Local Tax Act effectively stop the rewards. The Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and Communications just asks local governments to act 
according to the principles of the hometown tax donation system.213
Only a part of local governments obey the guidance. 
CONCLUSION
As the nuclear fuel taxes and the hometown tax donation 
demonstrate, tax competition among local governments in Japan is 
accelerating. This harms market economy by making it less efficient 
and fails to redistribute wealth. The present circumstances in 
Japan remind us of the essential function of the dormant Commerce 
Clause. It plays an important role in implementing basic principles 
of fiscal federalism. Even though Wayfair did not fully scrutinize 
the nature of indirect tax and paid little attention to the character 
of collection duty as it differs from ordinary tax liability, this 
United States Supreme Court decision expanded the range of the 
application of the legal doctrine and should be respected.  
213 See, e.g., MINISTER OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND COMMUNICATIONS, Furusato nozei ni 
kakaru henreihin no sofu to ni tsuite [ON THE REWARDS FOR HOMETOWN TAX DONATION]
(2017); Sżmushż jichi zeimu kyoku [MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND COMMC’NS, LOCAL
PUB. FIN. BUREAU], supra note 131, at 130–32 (providing administrative guidance on the 
rewards for hometown tax donation). 
